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The European Union's Deposit Guarantee 
Directive: A Critical Analysis 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the fundamental objectives of the European Union (EU) is 
the creation of a single marketplace. l Within the financial services 
sector, the EU has pursued its single market goal through the process 
of harmonization of national banking laws in conjunction with mutual 
recognition.2 The European Council has adopted directives covering 
matters such as regulatory capitaI,3 consolidated supervision,4 con-
sumer credit,5 and money laundering.6 The Deposit Guarantee Direc-
tive/ adopted on May 30, 1995, is the latest of these efforts to coordi-
nate the banking policies of the Member States. 
In addition to promoting a competitive and efficient market for 
banking services, the EU has sought to promote stability and con-
fidence in the financial system.s Deposit guarantee schemes serve the 
dual purposes of providing protection to depositors in the event of an 
institution-specific failure, as well as contributing to the stability of the 
banking system as a whole by reducing the risk of general runs.9 
"[D]eposit protection is as essential as the prudential rules for the 
completion of the single banking market."l0 
1 SeeJULIAN MAITLAND-WALKER, EC BANKING DIRECTIVES 1-1 (1994). 
2 See PATRICK PEARSON, AMSTERDAM FINANCIAL SERIES 7-8 (Martijin van Emprl ed., 1994). 
3 See Council Directive 89/299 of 17 April 1989 on the Own Funds of Credit Institutions, 1989 
OJ. (L 124) 1 (EEC) [hereinafter Own Funds Directive]. 
4 See Council Directive 92/30 of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a 
Consolidated Basis, 1992 OJ. (L 110) 52 (EEC). 
5 See Council Directive 90/88 of 22 February 1990 amending Directive 87/102 for the Approxi-
mation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the Member State Concerning 
Consumer Credit, 1990 OJ. (L 61) 14 (EEC). 
6 See Council Directive 91/308 oflO June 1991 on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System 
for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 1991 OJ. (L 166) 77 (EEC). 
7 Directive 94/19 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on Deposit-
Guarantee Schemes, 1994 OJ. (L 135) 5 [hereinafter Deposit Guarantee Directive]. 
8 See id. pmbl. (1st recital). 
9 See MARC DASSESSE ET AL., EC BANKING LAW 365 (1994). 
\0 Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, pmbl. (2nd recital). 
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Part I of this Note provides an overview of the primary legislative 
initiatives of the EU in the area of banking law. Part II discusses the 
major provisions of the Deposit Guarantee Directive. In addition, Part 
II considers the implementation of the Directive by Belgium, as well 
as the pending legal challenge brought by Germany in the Court of 
Justice. Part III contains an analysis of the conflicting policy objectives 
of home versus host country coverage of branch deposits, as well as the 
supervisory authority of host Member States over branches. Finally, this 
Note concludes, in Part IV, that while the Deposit Guarantee Directive 
appears to strike a balance between the policies underlying home 
versus host Member State coverage, the benefits of the Directive's 
parameters would be further enhanced by strengthening the enforce-
ment authority of host State regulators over branches participating in 
their guarantee schemes. 
I. THE PRINCIPAL EU BANKING DIRECTIVES 
The fundamental objective of the EU is the establishment of an 
integrated economy where goods, services, labor, and capital are per-
mitted to move freely.ll This is frequently referred to as the single 
market objective. The Treaty of Romel2 is the basic blueprint by which 
the EU will achieve a single market. 13 The EEC Treaty sets forth the 
basic rules for breaking down national barriers and harmonizing na-
tionallaws. 14 It was not, however, until the 1985 White Paper, Completing 
the Internal Market,15 and the adoption of the Single European Act in 
1987,16 that the EU formulated a detailed plan for achieving an inte-
grated common marketP 
In the White Paper, the European Commission identified the har-
monization of banking services as being critical to the success of the 
single market objective. ls Traditionally, banking, for prudential and 
monetary policy reasons, has been among the most highly regulated 
II See MAITLAND-WALKER, supra note 1, at 1-1. 
12 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, opened for signature Nov. 23, 
1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. 
13 See MAITLAND-WALKER, supra note 1, at 1-1. 
14 See id. 
15 Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Coun-
cil, COM(85)310 final at 1. 
lfiSingle European Act, 1987 OJ. (L 169) 1,25 I.L.M. 506 (1986) (amending the 1957 Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
17 See MAITLAND-WALKER, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
18 See id. 
1997] DEPOSIT GUARANTEE DIRECTIVE 337 
industries. 19 The existence of different national regulatory policies 
governing the issuance of bank charters, cross-border sales of services, 
and capital requirements, inter alia, has been an impediment to the 
fundamental goal of a common market. 20 Such disparate laws among 
the Member States are barriers to the free movement of services21 and 
capital22 as well as the freedom of establishment23 sought under the 
Treaty of Rome. 24 
The EU's adoption of the First Banking Co-ordination Directive25 
was the first major effort toward the harmonization of banking laws.26 
Passage of the First Banking Directive achieved two important goals.27 
First, it established common standards for the issuance of banking 
charters.28 Specifically, the standards addressed capital adequacy and 
the requisite quality of bank management.29 Second, the First Banking 
Directive called for the coordination of supervisory efforts among the 
regulatory authorities of the Member States.30 To that end, the multi-
lateral Bank Advisory Committee was established to develop common 
definitions for regulatory capital and solvency ratios. 31 The First Bank-
ing Directive also required Member State authorities to coordinate 
19 See id. at 3-1. 
20 See id. 
21 Article 59 of the EEC Treaty provides for the elimination of restrictions on the free movement 
of services. See EEC TREATY art. 59. Although not expressly excluded from the definition of 
services contained in Article 60, the EEC Treaty, in Article 61 (2), called for "[t]he liberalization 
of banking and insurance services connected with the movement of capital .... " Id. art. 61 (2). 
22 Article 67 of the EEC Treaty provides for the elimination of restrictions on the movement of 
capital. See id. art. 67. Specifically, Article 67 provides, in part: "During the transitional period 
... Member States shall progressively abolish between themselves all restrictions on the move· 
ment of capital." Id. 
23 Article 52 of the EEC Treaty promotes the freedom of establishment by prohibiting restric-
tions thereon. See id. art. 52. Article 52 provides, in part: "[R]estrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State on the territory of another Member State shall be 
abolished." Id. art. 52. "Freedom of establishment shall include the right to ... set up and manage 
undertakings ... under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country 
which such establishment is effected .... " Id. (emphasis added). 
24 See MAITLAND-WALKER, supra note 1, at 3-2. 
25 First Council Directive 77/780 of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regula-
tions and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of 
Credit Institutions, 1977 OJ. (L 322) 30 [hereinafter First Banking Directive]. 
26 See MANUS EGAN ET AL., EC FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION 3-3 to 3-4 (1994). 
27 See PAOLO CLAROTTI, E.e. FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION AND COMPANY LAW 2 (Mads 
Andenas & Dr. Stephen Kenyon-Slade eds., 1993). 
28 See id. 
29 See First Banking Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(2). 
30 See id. arts. 6(1), 7 (1). 
31 See id. art. 6. 
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their efforts with respect to monitoring bank liquidity and solvency.32 
In addition, the First Banking Directive provided for national treat-
ment of non-Member State banks.33 With respect to non-Member State 
branches, the First Banking Directive left Member States full discretion 
to set conditions for their authorization, provided that no such branch 
was treated more favorably than a branch of a Member State institu-
tion. 34 
Despite the progress achieved by the First Banking Directive, sig-
nificant barriers to the single market goal remained.35 To establish 
branches in all Member States, a credit institution was required to 
obtain separate authorizations from each Member State.36 Although 
not distinct legal entities, such branches were subject to host Member 
State regulations requiring the maintenance of a separate endowment 
for capital. 37 
The Council intended the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive38 
to address these difficulties.39 The major accomplishments of the Sec-
ond Banking Directive were the creation of the single banking license 
and the allocation of supervisory powers between home and host40 
Member States.41 The single banking license permits a credit institution 
authorized in one Member State to expand its businesses in other 
Member States through the cross-border provision of services or the 
establishment of branches without the necessity of obtaining separate 
authorizations from each Member State.42 The single banking license 
is based on the mutual recognition by the Member States of the 
32 See id. art. 7(1). 
33 See id. art. 9. National treatment means offering the same competitive advantages to foreign 
businesses as are available to domestic businesses. See ANDREW GAMBLE & GORDON TRAVERS, 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AFTER 1992, at 426 (Ralph H. Folsom et al. eds., 1993). 
34 See First Banking Directive, supra note 25, art. 9(1). 
35 See CLAROTTI, supra note 27, at 3. 
36 See id. 
37 See EGAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 3-4. 
38 Second Council Directive of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations 
and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit 
Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780 EEC, 1989 OJ. (L 386) 1 [hereinafter Second 
Banking Directive J. 
39 See CLAROTTI, supra note 27, at 3. 
40 "Home Member State" means the Member State in which a credit institution has been 
organized under the First Banking Directive. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 38, art. 
1 (7). "Host Member State" means a Member State, other than its Home Member State, in which 
a credit institution has a branch or in which it provides services. See id. art. 1 (8). 
41 See EGAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 3-4. 
42 See CLAROTTI, supra note 27, at 3. 
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adequacy of their respective standards for chartering and supervising 
credit institutions.43 
The Second Banking Directive is based on the universal banking 
mode1.44 Under the universal banking model, an institution is permit-
ted to engage in both traditional commercial banking and securities 
activities.45 With the single banking license created by the Second 
Banking Directive, an institution can provide, throughout the EU, 
those services that its home State charter permits and that are listed 
in the Annex to the Second Banking Directive.46 For example, German 
banks, which are authorized under laws based on the universal model, 
can conduct securities activities in Germany as well as Member States 
which do not permit their own banks to do the same.47 This competitive 
inequality will increase pressure for the adoption of universal banking 
throughout the EU.4s 
The Second Banking Directive also divides supervisory authority 
between home and host State regulators.49 It vests primary responsibil-
ity for supervising cross-border services and branches with home State 
authorities.50 Host State authorities, however, retain supervisory 
authority over branch liquidity,51 factors affecting monetary policy,52 
and exposure to host State financial markets.53 In addition, host State 
regulators are vested with the general power to compel compliance 
with national regulations adopted for "the general good. "54 Although 
a host State regulator must first appeal to an institution's home State 
regulator, the host State regulator can take dispositive enforcement 
action in the event that the home State regulator is unresponsive.55 
43 See EGAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 3--4. 
44 See id. at 3-6. 
45 See id. at 3-5 to 3-6. 
46The services enumerated in the Annex to the Second Banking Directive include: deposit 
taking, lending, leasing, funds transfer, payment systems, guarantees and letters of credit, securi-
ties trading, securities underwriting, mergers and acquisitions advisory services, money brokering, 
asset management, securities clearance and safekeeping, credit reference services, and safe 
custody services. See Second Banking Directive, supra note 38, annex. 
47 See EGAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 3-4. 
48 See id. 
49 See Second Banking Directive, supra note 38, art. 13(1). 
50 See id. 
51 See id. art. 14(2). 
52 See id. 
53 See id. art. 14(3). 
54 See Second Banking Directive, supra note 38, art. 21 (5). 
55 See id. art. 21 (4). 
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II. THE DEPOSIT GUARANTEE DIRECTIVE 
A. Explanation of Major Provisions 
On July 1, 1995, the Deposit Guarantee Directive (Directive) took 
effect. 56 The Directive requires each Member State to establish one or 
more deposit protection schemes. 57 Subject to certain narrow excep-
tions, all credit institutions must participate in a guarantee scheme 
established under the laws of the Member State in which they are 
chartered.58 In addition, the Directive provides for enforcement 
authority; however, in the case of noncompliance by a branch, primary 
enforcement authority is vested in the home State rather than the host 
State.59 As discussed below, this allocation of enforcement authority 
presents a potential problem area for host State regulators. In the event 
that an institution fails to comply within the time frame and in accord-
ance with any conditions dictated jointly by the home and host State 
regulators, the Directive authorizes the institution's home State regu-
lators to revoke its charter.6o The other major standards prescribed by 
the Directive address: (1) the allocation of financial responsibility 
among the protection schemes of the Member States; (2) the level and 
scope of coverage; and (3) the manner in which the guarantee schemes 
are to be administered. 
1. Allocation of Financial Responsibility 
The Directive provides that Member States' deposit guarantee 
schemes shall cover the domestic deposits of institutions they have 
chartered, as well as the deposits in branches of those institutions 
located in other Member States.61 Until December 31, 1999, the cover-
age provided for branches shall not be more comprehensive, in terms 
56 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 14(1). 
57 See id. art. 3(1). 
58 See id. An institution which belongs to a protection scheme that guarantees the solvency of 
the institution itself may be exempt from participation in a deposit guarantee scheme. See id. art. 
3(1). This exemption is mainly for the benefit of certain German savings banks and credit 
cooperatives. See SYDNEY J. KEy, AMSTERDAM FINANCIAL SERIES 15 (Martijin van Emprl ed., 1994). 
In addition, the Directive provides transitional rules for certain institutions chartered in Spain 
or Greece. See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 12. 
59 See id. art 4( 4). 
60 See id. art. 3(5). 
61 See id. arts. 3(1), 4(1). 
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of level and scope, than the coverage provided by the guarantee 
scheme adopted by the host State.62 Furthermore, where the coverage 
extended to a branch by its home State guarantee scheme is less 
favorable than the coverage provided by the host State's scheme, the 
credit institution can voluntarily elect for its branch to participate in 
the host State's scheme.63 Supplementary coverage, however, only ex-
tends protection to the extent that the host State's coverage is more 
favorable than the home State's coverage.64 This is known as the "top-
ping up" provision.65 A credit institution makes an election for supple-
mental coverage by submitting a request to the host State regulators. 56 
Member States are authorized to establish objective conditions to mem-
bership in their guarantee schemes on a bilateral basis with the home 
Member States of foreign institutions electing supplemental coverage.67 
Annex II sets forth "guiding principles" addressing such matters as 
supervisory authority, financial reporting, certification of insolvency, 
rights of set-off, and guarantee assessments. 68 
For example, if the Belgian guarantee scheme offers insurance pro-
tection up to ECU 20,000 for qualified deposits, then deposits booked 
at the domestic offices of Belgian-chartered institutions are covered to 
ECU 20,000.69 In addition, branches of Belgian institutions are also 
covered by the Belgian protection scheme to ECU 20,000.70 Assuming 
the guarantee scheme in Spain provides deposit protection to only 
ECU 15,000,71 a Spanish branch of a Belgian institution would receive 
only the level of coverage available to Spanish chartered institutions, 
namely, ECU 15,000.72 
Belgian bank branches could choose supplemental coverage in those 
Member States where coverage is greater than that of Belgium.73 For 
62 See id. art. 4(1). 
63 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(2). 
64 See KEy, supra note 58, at 17-22. 
65 See id. 
66 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(2)-(4). 
67 See id. art. 4(3), annex II. 
68 See id. annex II. 
69 See Michael Tison, Implementation of the Deposit Guarantee Directive in Belgium-A General 
Overview, 2 EUR. FIN. SERVICES L., Aug.-Sept. 1995, at 215,215,217. 
70 See id. at 215. 
71 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 7(1) (transitional coverage ofECU 15,000 
through December 31, 1999). 
72 See id. art. 4(1). 
73 See id. art. 4(2). 
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example, in Germany the level of protection greatly exceeds the Direc-
tive's ECU 20,000 minimum.74 So, a German branch of a Belgian bank 
would have the benefit of protection under the Belgian plan to ECU 
20,000.75 In addition, the branch could elect supplemental coverage 
under the German scheme to the extent that German coverage is 
greater. 76 This example illustrates the hybrid nature of deposit protec-
tion under the Directive where the level of protection offered by 
Member States is not uniform. 77 
Article 6 prescribes the framework for non-EU credit institutions.78 
Specifically, Member States may require the branch of a non-Member 
State bank to join an appropriate guarantee scheme within its territory 
if the guarantee scheme of its chartering country provides less protec-
tion than the host Member State scheme.79 For example, Belgian law 
requires the Belgian branch of a U.S. bank to join its deposit guarantee 
scheme because the U.S. deposit insurance scheme does not insure 
deposits booked at the foreign branches of U.S. institutions.8o The 
Directive does not preclude a non-EU bank from obtaining coverage 
for a subsidiary bank.81 
2. Level and Scope of Coverage 
Member States' protection schemes may also contain differences in 
terms of level and scope of coverage. The primary purpose of deposit 
guarantee schemes is to protect unsophisticated depositors, such as 
ordinary consumers.82 The Council defined the minimum level and 
scope of protection set forth in the Directive with this fundamental 
purpose in mind.83 
Article 7 (l) of the Directive provides for a minimum level of cover-
age ofECU 20,000 in aggregate deposits per depositor. 84 Subparagraph 
2 of Article 7(1) provides a transitional rule: until December 31, 1999, 
74 See Dirk Schoen maker, Internationalisation of Banking Supervision and Deposit Insurance, 8 J. 
INT'L BANKING L. 106,112 (1993). 
75 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(1). 
76 See id. art. 4(2). 
77 See KEy, supra note 58, at 10-14. 
78 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 6. 
79 See id. art. 6 (1 ) . 
80 See 12 U.S.c. § 183lr(a) (Supp. V 1993). 
81 See KEy, supra note 58, at 7-8. 
82 See id. at 9. 
83 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, pmbl. (16th recital). 
84 See id. art. 7 (1 ) . 
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the minimum level of coverage provided shall be no less than ECU 
15,000.85 With respect to home State deposits, the Directive does not 
impose a maximum level of coverage.86 
The Directive does not cover all depositors and deposits.87 The Di-
rective provides for mandatoryB8 and optional89 exclusions which deter-
mine the scope of coverage provided by a Member State's protection 
scheme. The optional exclusions permit the Member States to exclude 
certain depositors from coverage entirely or, in the alternative, extend 
a lower level of coverage.90 
Article 2 of the Directive enumerates three types of deposits required 
to be excluded from coverage by a guarantee schemeYl The first and 
second exclusions are deposits made by other credit institutions for 
their own account and all instruments classified as "own funds" in 
Article 2 of Council Directive 89/299/EEC of April 1989.92 These 
exclusions are based on the notion that parties who support the risk-
taking activities of the institution or who are in a better position to 
assess the risk of the institution should bear the risk of insolvency.93 
85 See id. 
8fi See id. art. 7 (3). 
87 See id. arts. 2, 7 (2). 
88 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 2. 
8Y See id. art. 7 (2). 
YO Annex I to the Directive provides a list of depositor and deposit types which can be excluded 
from coverage at the discretion of the Member States. They are as follows: 
(1) Deposits by financial institutions as defined in Article 1 (6) of Directive 86/646; 
(2) Deposits of insurance companies; 
(3) Deposits by government and central administrative authorities; 
(4) Deposits by provincial, regional, local and municipal authorities; 
(5) Deposits by collective investment undertakings; 
(6) Deposits by pension and retirement funds; 
(7) Deposits by certain senior managers, officers, directors, and principal share-
holders; 
(8) Deposits by close relatives of the individuals referred to in item 7; 
(9) Deposits by affiliates; 
(10) Non-nominative deposits; 
(11) Deposits of borrowers who obtained credit on terms detrimental to the insti-
tution; 
(12) Debt securities, acceptances, and promissory notes; 
(13) Deposits in currencies other than that of the Member States or the ECU; and 
(14) Deposits of large companies. 
See id. annex 1. 
91 See id. art. 2. 
92 The term "own funds" essentially refers to regulatory capital. See Own Funds Directive, supra 
note 3, art. 2. 
93 See Tison, supra note 69, at 216. 
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The third exclusion contained in Article 2 denies coverage to deposits 
arising from money laundering activities. 94 
Annex I to the Directive provides a list of certain types of deposits 
or depositors for which exclusion is optional.95 These optional exclu-
sions generally include debt securities, deposits denominated in non-
Member State currencies, institutional investors and insiders.96 
In addition, the Directive contains a limited co-insurance provision.97 
Specifically, the Directive permits up to 10% of the risk to be borne by 
the depositor.98 For example, assuming a 10% co-insurance require-
ment, the depositor would absorb 10% of the loss up to ECU 22,222 
and all of the loss in excess of that amount.99 
3. Administration of Guarantee Schemes 
Article 10 provides that guarantee schemes shall payoff depositors 
within three months of the date on which the bank is determined to 
be insolvent. lOo Under exceptional circumstances, the regulators can 
permit up to three three-month extensions. lOl The Directive also pro-
vides for subrogation rights. 102 Lastly, the Directive grants depositors a 
cause of action against the guarantee scheme to ensure compensation 
in the event that the scheme does not meet its obligations. 103 
B. Belgian Implementation oj the Directive 
Belgium was among the first to implement the Deposit Guarantee 
Directive when its enabling legislation became effective on January 1, 
1995. 104 The Belgian scheme, which consolidated four deposit protec-
tion programs, preserves all of the major features set forth in the 
Directive. los 
94 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 2. 
95 See id. art. 7 (2). 
96 See id. annex I. 
97 See id. art. 7(4). 
98 See id. 
99 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 7(4). 
100 See id. art. lO(I). 
101 See id. art. 10(2). 
102 See id. art. II. Subrogation rights are the rights of the deposit guarantee scheme to step in 
the shoes of the depositors, to the extent it has paid off the depositors, for the purpose of seeking 
recovery from the institution and any other culpable parties contributing to the bank's failure. 
See KEy, supra note 58, at 47. 
103 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 7(6). 
104 See Tison, supra note 69, at 215. 
105 See id. 
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Membership in a guarantee scheme is compulsory for Belgian char-
tered banks. lo6 In accordance with the hybrid financial responsibility 
provisions of the Directive, the Belgian scheme provides coverage for 
domestic deposits of its credit institutions, as well as deposits booked 
in Belgian bank branches located in other Member States.107 With 
respect to Belgian branches of non-EU country institutions-an area 
left to the discretion of the Member States by the Directive-member-
ship is compulsory unless the branch is covered by a guarantee scheme 
of its chartering country which affords depositor protection equivalent 
to that of the Belgian scheme. lOS The Belgian scheme incorporates, in 
addition to the mandatory exclusions contained in Article 2 of the 
Directive, all of the discretionary exclusions contained in Armex I to 
the Directive.lOg 
The minimum level of deposit coverage was set at the Directive's 
minimum of ECU 20,OOO.llO This represents an increase from approxi-
mately ECU 13,150-the level of coverage previously available to de-
positors of private banks. III At present the Belgian scheme does not 
include a co-insurance provision, although the regulatory authorities 
are empowered to adopt one. ll2 
Lastly, the guarantee scheme is funded by assessments based on the 
size of the deposit base qualifying for coverage. ll3 Additional compul-
sory contributions, in the event that the scheme's resources become 
strained, are limited to twice the regular annual assessment.1l4 
C. German Legal Challenge to the Directive 
On August 18, 1994 Germany brought an action against the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council of the European Union in the Euro-
pean Court of Justice seeking to annul the Deposit Guarantee Directive 
or, in the alternative, strike certain provisions concerning maximum 
coverage, topping-up by branches, and compulsory membership.ll5 
Germany advocates annulment of the Directive on the basis that the 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See Tison, supra note 69, at 216. 
110 See id. at 217. 
III See id. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. at 218. 
114 See Tison, supra note 69, at 218. 
115 See Case 233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament & Council, 1994 OJ. (C 275) 
20 (case pending). 
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Council lacks a sufficient legal basis for adoption of the Directive.ll6 
That is, the Directive cannot be based on the first and third sentences 
of Article 57 (2) of the EEC Treaty alone as is represented in its recit-
als. ll7 Those references to the EEC Treaty, it is alleged, support only a 
harmonization of deposit guarantee schemes and not the improve-
ment of depositor protection. lIS The objective of improving depositor 
protection, it is further contended, requires reference to Article 235 
of the EEC Treaty.ll9 In the alternative, the Germans object to the pro-
visions limiting the coverage provided to branches of German banks 
in other Member States and to the requirement that supplemental 
coverage be made available to the branches of institutions authorized 
by other Member States.120 
The maximum coverage provision dictates that neither the scope 
nor the level of coverage provided to a branch by its home State 
scheme shall exceed the maximum scope or level of coverage provided 
by the host State guarantee scheme.121 The purpose of this provision is 
to promote competitive equality. 122 Under its current deposit guarantee 
system, Germany offers the highest coverage of any EU country.123 
Nearly all deposits are guaranteed.124 Therefore, the maximum cover-
age provision effectively restricts German branches located in all other 
Member States from offering the full protection available to their de-
positors than otherwise would be available if the deposits were booked 
in German territory. The German government argues that this restric-
tion not only "reverses the principle of creditor protection," but also 
"compels the relinquishment of a competitive advantage resulting from 
better quality. "125 Protecting domestic banks against competition is no 
justification for limiting deposit coverage. 126 The larger concern should 
lIn See id. 
Il7 See id. The first sentence of Article 57(2) of the EEC Treaty provides that the Council shall 
act on a proposal from the Commission and, after consulting the European Parliament, issue 
directives for the coordination of provisions laid down by law in Member States concerning 
"self-employed persons." EEC TREATY art. 57(2). The third sentence of Article 57(2) provides: 
"In other cases the Council shall act by a qualified majority, in cooperation with the European 
Parliament." Id. art. 57(2). 
IIH See Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament & Council, 1994 OJ. (C 275) at 20. 
119 See id. Article 235 of the EEC Treaty requires unanimous approval by the Council of any 
proposal not expressly provided for by the Treaty. See EEC TREATY art. 235. 
120 See Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament & Council, 1994 OJ. (C 275) at 20. 
121 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(1). 
122 See id. pmbl. (14th recital). 
123 See Schoenmaker, supra note 74, at 112. 
124 See id. 
125 Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament & Council, 1994 OJ. (C 275) at 20. 
126 See id. 
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be consumer protection, which is enhanced by more comprehensive 
coverage. 127 
In addition, the German complaint also seeks to have the supple-
mental guarantee provision invalidated. 128 The supplemental guaran-
tee provision requires the extension of deposit guarantees by the Ger-
man guarantee scheme to branches of non-German institutions that 
elect such coverage. 12Y The Bundesbank, the German central bank, 
objects to the topping-up provision because the primary regulatory 
authority for the branches lies with the institutions' home State regu-
lators. 13o It is contended that this supervisory structure imposes the risk 
of insolvency of foreign branches on the deposit guarantee scheme of 
the host country, while the host country lacks sufficient supervisory 
authority to manage that risk. l3l Furthermore, it is contended that the 
Directive does not confer on the host State regulators any substantive 
enforcement authority.132 
III. ANALYSIS-HYBRID COVERAGE AND ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
A. Hybrid Coverage 
As described above, the Deposit Guarantee Directive adopted a hy-
brid system of coverage with respect to branch deposits. 133 Under the 
hybrid system, primary deposit coverage is provided by the credit 
institution's home State.134 Where host State coverage is more compre-
hensive than home State coverage, supplemental coverage is available 
and is provided by the host State guarantee scheme.135 This hybrid 
system balances the concerns with respect to pure home or pure host 
State coverage. 
The chief concern of the proponents of pure home State coverage 
is that, under a host State coverage system, the host State regulator 
must rely on the home State regulators to monitor the safety and 
soundness of a participating institution and take prompt enforcement 
action when necessary.136 Branches are not legal entities distinct from 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 20-21. 
129 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(2). 
130 See Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament & Council, 1994 OJ. (C 275) at 20-21. 
131 See id. 
m Ser id. at 21. 
133 See KEy, supra note 58, at 10-14. 
134 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(1). 
135 See id. art. 4(2). 
136 See Schoenmaker, supra note 74, at 107-09. 
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their home office. 137 The assets of a branch are subject to all the 
liabilities of the institution as a whole. 138 In addition, the Second Bank-
ing Directive precludes the imposition of capital equivalency or asset 
maintenance requirements by host Member States as a means to miti-
gate the effects of insolvency.139 Without the power to set prudential 
regulations and monitor and enforce compliance, the host States' 
schemes are at the mercy of inadequate home State supervision.140 
On the other hand, the proponents of host State protection are 
concerned with consumer awareness and the competitive distortions 
which may result from home State coverage. 141 First, it is conceivable 
that a depositor may be faced with twelve different variations of deposit 
coverage from which to choose.142 The primary concern here is with 
consumer awareness-the ability of unsophisticated depositors to com-
prehend the different coverages available to them. 143 Thus, the propo-
nents of host State coverage assert a need for uniformity to promote 
consumer protection.144 If the coverage available to depositors is uni-
form throughout the host State, no inequity can result from lack of 
understanding. 145 
Second, if a branch is covered by it's home State guarantee scheme, 
without any limitation, and the home State scheme provides more 
comprehensive coverage than that of the host State, depositors might 
transfer deposits from institutions offering lower coverage to institu-
tions offering more comprehensive coverage. 146 The proponents of 
host State coverage characterize the potential deposit migration as a 
"competitive distortion."147 Home State coverage advocates counter 
with the argument that the added competition would result in a uni-
form and greater level of coverage. 148 That is, the ensuing competition 
among credit institutions to maintain their deposit bases would be to 
the public's benefit since Member States with lower coverage would be 
pressured to increase coverage in order to stem the outflow of deposits 
137 See id. at 108-10. 
138 See EGAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 3-4. 
139 See id. 
140 See Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament & Council, 1994 OJ. (C 275) at 20-21. 
141 See KEy, supra note 58, at 8. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 See KEy, supra note 58, at 26-30. 
147 Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, pmbl. (14th recital). 
148 See KEy, supra note 58, at 26-30. 
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from their institutions. 149 This is the argument asserted in the German 
legal challenge discussed above. 150 That argument is further countered, 
of course, by the moral hazard argument. 151 Under the moral hazard 
theory, more comprehensive coverage of deposits would induce insti-
tutions to take imprudent risks under the theory that the guarantee 
scheme will cover the losses of depositors.1 52 Moral hazard is the policy 
justification for many of the mandatory and optional coverage exclu-
sions contained in the Directive.153 
In short, the hybrid structure of deposit guarantees under the Di-
rective is a pragmatic approach to balancing competing interests. The 
system promotes consumer protection while limiting moral hazard. 154 
With respect to host State schemes providing supplemental coverage, 
the risk to the schemes is partially mitigated by primary home State 
coverage.155 The risk concerns of certain Member States that offer 
protection in excess of the Directive's minimum requirements could 
be further addressed by strengthening their enforcement authority 
over noncomplying institutions. 
B. Enforcement Authority 
Where the level and scope of coverage offered by a host Member 
State exceeds that of a bank's home State, branches of the bank can 
elect supplemental coverage under the host State guarantee scheme.156 
A branch must satisry certain conditions in order to qualiry for mem-
bership in the host Member State's guarantee scheme.157 In the event 
of noncompliance with guarantee scheme membership requirements, 
however, host State regulators can initiate an enforcement action 
against the non-complying branch only in collaboration with the home 
State regulators. 15s If the branch fails to comply with enforcement steps 
taken by the regulators, the host State regulators can exclude the 
branch from the guarantee scheme, but only with the consent of the 
149 See id. 
150 See Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament & Council, 1994 OJ. (C 275) at 20. 
151 See Schoenmaker, supra note 74, at 107. 
152 See id. 
153 See Tison, supra note 69, at 216-17. 
154 See Schoenmaker, supra note 74, at 111-12. 
155 See id. 
156 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(2). 
157 See id. art. 4(3). 
158 See id. art. 4(4). 
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branch's home State regulator. 159 Exclusion from the deposit guarantee 
scheme will force the branch to cease operations. 
Several Member States expressed concern about host Member State 
coverage in the aftermath of the collapse of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce In ternationale in 1991.160 The concern was that under host 
country coverage schemes the risk of branch insolvency is borne by 
the host Member State, which does not have effective supervisory 
authority over the participating institution. 161 While the development 
of the hybrid coverage structure partially mitigates this concern, host 
State schemes remain at risk to the extent of the supplementary cov-
erage elected by Member branches.162 
With respect to these branches, however, the host State lacks inde-
pendent enforcement authority.163 The Directive mandates collabora-
tion between the home State and host State regulators.164 In the event 
that either the home State regulators of the branch at question are 
unresponsive, or the branch fails to come into compliance, the host 
State regulators cannot unilaterally exclude the branch from cover-
age. 165 Without the consent of the home State regulator, the host State 
regulator cannot exclude the offending branch and the host State's 
guarantee scheme remains at risk for the deposits of the noncomplying 
branch. 
Furthermore, this allocation of enforcement authority runs counter 
to that provided in the Second Banking Directive.166 Under the Second 
Banking Directive, the host Member State regulators have the authority 
to initiate enforcement actions against foreign institutions failing to 
comply with the laws of that Member State.167 In the event that the 
credit institution fails to respond to the host State's action, the host 
State regulators must then seek the assistance of the institution's home 
State regulators. 168 However, if the institution continues to be in non-
compliance the host Member State can unilaterally take further action 
including withdrawal of authorization, i.e., branch closure.169 
1;;9 See id. 
lfiO See KEv, supra note 58, at 8. 
161 See Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament & Council, 1994 OJ. (C 275) at 20. 
162 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 4(4). 
163 See id. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See Second Banking Directive, supra note 38, art. 21. 
lfi7Id. art. 21 (2). 
16BId. art. 21 (3). 
lfi9Id. art. 21(4)-(10). 
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In contrast with the Deposit Guarantee Directive, the Second Bank-
ing Directive reserves the ultimate enforcement power to the host 
State. 170 Under the Deposit Guarantee Directive, host Member States 
are expressly precluded from taking independent enforcement action, 
yet must bear the risk of a noncomplying branches' insolvency.17! Pre-
sumably, the foundation for this allocation of enforcement authority is 
the notion that home Member States should take an active role in 
enforcement since they provide the primary level of deposit guarantee 
coverage. 
There appears to be no substantive impediment, however, to vesting 
both the home and host State regulators with concurrent enforcement 
authority. That is, in the event that an institution fails to comply with 
the laws of its home State, the home State regulators can take correc-
tive action. Likewise, in the event that an institution is not in compli-
ance with the laws of its host State, then the host State regulators could 
also take independent enforcement action. A system of concurrent 
enforcement authority would not subject an institution to any greater 
regulatory burden, but it would make institutions with foreign 
branches more accountable to host State regulatory authorities in a 
manner consistent with the Second Banking Directive. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the hybrid coverage structure, although not without 
limitations, balances the concerns of conflicting interests. The risk 
exposure of host Member States is partially mitigated by limiting their 
financial responsibility to supplemental insurance while the home 
State scheme assumes primary responsibility. In addition, the maxi-
mum limitation on home State coverage extending to branches ad-
dresses consumer protection concerns by providing uniformity of cov-
erage. While this deposit guarantee regime appears fundamentally 
sound, it would be further enhanced by strengthening the enforce-
ment authority of host State regulators over branches participating in 
their guarantee schemes. By granting concurrent enforcement author-
ity, host State regulators would be better able to protect the interests 
of their guarantee scheme. 
Thomas S. Hornbaker 
170 Compare Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra note 7, art. 4( 4) with Second Banking Directive, 
supra note 38, art. 2(4)-(10). 
171 See Deposit Guarantee Directive, supra art. 7, art. 4(4). 
